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ABSTRACT 
 What role do state and non-state sponsors play in the decision-making process of 
Lebanese Salafi groups? This thesis examines the ideologies of various Lebanese Islamist 
groups in relation to those of their declared and clandestine sponsors to find out whether 
these groups diverted from their core ideological principles because of external sponsor 
pressure. The examination presents a case study of North Lebanon and Tripoli, in 
particular, based on media reports and publicly available government documents as well 
as scholarly research in both the English and Arabic languages to offer a complete, 
accurate, and unbiased view. After providing an overview of the historical roots of 
Salafism, the thesis examines the groups’ respective ideologies, structures, leadership, 
and sources of funding. Finally, the thesis compares the impact of those financial sources 
on the examined areas. A main finding is that all but one of the examined groups are 
driven by the influence of money; they shifted their respective ideologies in order to meet 
the interests of their state sponsors. Although ideological considerations are important for 
Salafi groups in Lebanon, the interests of external sponsors are often prioritized above 
local political preferences. A policy implication of this analysis is that analyzing external 
sponsor preferences is potentially predictive of the conduct of Lebanese Salafis. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The dynamics of Salafism globally has been crucial in shaping the structure of the 
Lebanese Salafi scene due to its dense transnational linkages, especially to the Arabic 
Gulf States. This thesis provides insights into what drives the social and political rise of 
Salafis in Lebanon after a period of low profile. In addition, it will look into the effects of 
the global split within Salafism into a politically quietist faction and an activist one, and 
how the internal transformation of the movement in the Gulf countries led to the 
fragmentation of the Lebanese Salafi community. 
Specifically, this study asks what role state and non-state sponsors play in the 
decision-making of Salafi groups. Will the Lebanese Salafi groups divert from the core 
ideological principles to which they adhere because of pressure from their sponsors? How 
does that affect their image in the eyes of the public? To answer these questions, this 
thesis undertakes a case study of North Lebanon and tries to relate the Salafi groups 
present in the north with sponsors that influence those groups. Through the lens of these 
Salafi groups, the thesis tries to explain the political orientation of Lebanon’s Salafism. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Salafism has been a salient religious trend, but it recently developed into a more 
activist movement. The term Salafi itself has been around since the 12th century. 
According to Bernard Haykel, Salafis existed long before the 1990s; he based his finding 
on “a fatwa in which Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) uses the Arabic noun al-salafiyya.”1 
Salafism is not a movement or a hierarchal organization that operates under the 
leadership of a singular figure. Since the first wave of Salafism was ushered in by Jamal 
ad-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida 
(1865–1935), the term Salafism has become associated with a more violent activist 
methodology. 
 
1 Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” in Roel Meijer, ed. Global Salafism: 
Islam’s New Religious Movement (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 38. 
2 
The study of Salafi movements in general by Western scholars is relatively new. 
It was primarily after 9/11 that they wanted to understand the development of Islamist 
ideology. When it came to Lebanon, however, Western academic researchers have 
written extensively on Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’ite militia that is currently a 
government party. Backed by Iran, Hezbollah has been a rich asset for Iran’s proxy wars 
in Syria, Yemen, and South Lebanon. Little attention has been given to Lebanon’s Salafi 
scene, which is another potential source of instability in the region. This thesis looks into 
this neglected aspect deeply and tries to find out the potential threats arising from the 
Lebanese Salafis. 
Lebanon’s Salafi movement started as a peaceful ideological movement but 
became more radical for socio-political reasons. Before the Lebanese Civil War (1975–
1990), Salafis in Lebanon constituted a marginal group with no significant political or 
social influence. Yet, in the 1990s, Salafis, on one hand, backed by the Gulf, established 
themselves in Northern Lebanese society and became an influential movement. On the 
other, backed by Iran, they strengthened their grip over the Palestinian camps, mainly Ain 
El-Hilwi, and had several clashes with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
According to Bernard Rougier, a pro-Iranian organization known as the Congregation of 
Muslim Ulama (Tajammu’ al-Ulamaa al-Muslimin) played a role in the war of the 
camps.2 Palestinian Sheikhs Ibrahim Ghunaym, Jamal Khattab, Abdallah Hallaq, and 
others advocated for Islamism among the Palestinians to counter the PLO.3 Since the 
Arab Spring, Salafism has increased its presence on the socio-political map of the Middle 
East. In a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted in 
November 2018, the number of jihadi-fighters was 270 percent greater than in 2001.4 The 
Middle East was one of the regions with the highest number of such fighters, with Syria 
 
2 Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 2007, 32–33. 
3 Rougier, 40–48. 
4 Seth G. Jones, Charles Vallee, Danika Newlee, Nicholas Harrington, Clayton Sharb, and Hannah 
Byrne, “The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat: Current and Future Challenges from the Islamic State, 
Al-Qaeda, and Other Groups,” CSIS, November 2018, IV, https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-
jihadist-threat. 
3 
having “between 43,650 and 70,550 fighters.”5 Tensions between Lebanese Salafis and 
Shi’ites have been rising due to Hezbollah’s continuous wins in its fights against Salafi 
groups in Syria. More concerning, Salafis in Lebanon might try to bring the fight inside 
the fragile country of Lebanon, sparking yet another civil conflict. 
Factors such as “changes in leaders, effectiveness of leaders, fluctuations in 
outside support, and changes in territorial control” often lead individual fighters and 
supporters to shift between groups or networks.6 This fluidity suggests that studies should 
focus on jihadi networks rather than their formal groups. The ties of the Lebanese Salafis 
to other Salafi movements outside Lebanon might direct their actions to suit the agendas 
of foreign countries. This might cause instability in the region and could potentially harm 
the interests of the United States in the Middle East. At the same time, these networks can 
be fertile soil for global Salafis for money laundering and arms deals because of the 
mixed nature of Lebanese society. It would be a mistake to declare victory over terrorism 
too early and, thus, mistakenly redirect the available resources and attention away from 
terrorist groups. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are at least two prominent views of Salafism in Western scholarship. The 
first and perhaps the most dominant view emphasizes the ideology of Salafism. The 
implicit assumption is that ideology is a major driver of Salafi movements and their 
political conduct. The second approach emphasizes the political context that shapes the 
growth and specific ideology of Salafism. The implicit assumption is that ideas alone do 
not explain the political behavior of Salafi movements. These two approaches can inform 
the study of Salafism in Lebanon, but they also may overlook a third dimension: the role 
of regional sponsors and external funding for Salafi movements. I suspect that all three 
approaches are important to fully understand the evolution of Salafism in Lebanon. 
Who are the Salafis? 
 
5 Jones et al., “The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat.” 
6 Jones et al. 
4 
The public understanding of the word “Salafis,” i.e., returning to the pious 
predecessors, differs from the academic understanding, which relates the word Salafi to 
the violent actions conducted in the name of Islam. For the majority of Sunni Muslims, 
Salafis call for the return to the first four successors of Prophet Muhammad, the rightly 
guided caliphs. This definition adopted by Muslims such as Khoulani and Aboutaleb 
generalizes the Salafi term, thus making it include more people than the Salafis 
referenced by academics.7 For the broader public, mainly people who fear Salafism, the 
term is equal to “extremist” or “radical” forms of Islamism. 
According to the French scholar Henri Lauziere, from 1920s onward, Salafism 
shifted away from Islamic modernism. Before 1990, academics considered that the birth 
of Salafism started during the late 19th century and not in the medieval period.8 Yet, after 
the destruction of the caliphate that followed the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
creation of the Mandate territories, the vulnerability of the umma was evident. The rise of 
a young and ambitious Saudi state gave hope of a “social and political renaissance in the 
Muslim world,” hence attracting many influential reformers, including Rashid Rida.9 
Elites of the Saudi state were promoted by publishers such as Salafiyya Press and 
Bookstore and Manar Press.10 This perhaps created the correlation between the terms 
Salafism and Wahhabism and prepared the public for what might be considered a “neo-
Salafiyya.” 
Salafis share the same beliefs but differ politically. Quintan Wiktorowicz has 
categorized Salafis into purists, politicos, and jihadis. He defines purists as the Salafis 
who “emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and 
 
7 Joas Wagemakers, “Salafism: Generalisation, Conceptualisation and Categorisation,” in Magnus 
Ranstorp, Contextualising Salafism and Salafi Jihadism (Copenhagen: Danish Centre for Prevention of 
Extremism, March 2020), 22. 
8 Henri Lauzière,  “The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of 
Conceptual History,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, no. 3 (August 2010): 373. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743810000401. 
9  Lauzière, 382. 
10  Lauzière. 
5 
education.”11 On the other hand, politicos to him “emphasize application of a Salafi creed 
to the political arena, which they view as particularly important because it dramatically 
impacts social justice and the right of God alone to legislate.”12 Jihadis, finally, “take a 
more militant position and argue that the current context calls for violence and 
revolution.”13 Another Hungarian scholar, Zoltan Pall, initially divided Salafis into 
obedient purists and activists (harakis) depending on their political approach to the ruler. 
Then, he subdivided purists into “purist-rejectionists” who stay away from politics 
entirely, and “purists-politically oriented” who engage in politics.14 The latter do so not 
to as an act of opposing the leaders per se; rather, they look at it as engaging in 
missionary activities. Harakis, however, take part in non-violent “political activism.”15 
Later on, Pall added the jihadis who “believe that removing secular regimes and 
imposing Islamic legislation could happen only through armed jihad.”16 
1. Approaches to Salafism 
Scholars have different views as to why Salafism spreads and flourishes in certain 
areas. Their categorization falls into two major approaches, the ideological approach and 
the political approach. Bernard Haykel and Maher Shiraz are among the scholars who 
believe that ideology is the basic motivator. They put weight on ideas that motivate 
people and allow them to act accordingly. On the other hand, Thomas Hegghammer and 
Barbara Walter find it difficult for ideology to explain the political decisions that Salafis 
take. For them, what motivates people is the political stand, and ideology plays but a 
minor role. 
For the scholars who support the ideological approach, teachings and opinions 
should be derived from authoritative sources. According to Shiraz Maher, ideological and 
 
11 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 
3 (2006): 208. 
12 Wiktorowicz, 208. 
13  Wiktorowicz. 
14 Zoltan Pall, Salafism in Lebanon: Local and Transnational Movements (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 19–22. 
15 Pall. 
16 Pall, 21. 
6 
political ways of thinking differ in that ideology attempts to “bring together a series of 
speculative abstractions into a coherent doctrine in the pursuit of utopia or, at the very 
least, a better way of living.”17 For Haykel, Salafism had always portrayed itself as the 
binary opposite of Sufism.18 This suggests that the base of Salafism is the war of ideas; 
hence, what Salafis value first are the principles and ideas that unite them. For that, 
Salafis always cite the sacred writings of the Quran to back up their actions claiming 
religious certainty.19 These claims are a trademark of the Salafis.20 They claim that they 
rely only on the sound proof-texts from revelation, and any judgment or opinion is based 
on relevant verses. 
The core principles that constitute the base of Salafi practice can influence 
everyday life for its followers. According to Haykel, even ordinary Muslims who do not 
self-identify as Salafis are attracted to the idea of textual forms of authority and the “call 
for reform of Muslim belief and practice by returning to the model of Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions.”21 Haykel concentrates on the principle of theology, 
and stresses that inner faith and manifest action constitute true belief for Salafis, and that 
together, these variables can either increase or decrease that belief.22  
On the other hand, Maher considers theology as one of five principles or filters by 
which Salafis explain their deeds. For him, Jihad, Takfir, Al-Wala’ Wa-L-Baraa, and 
Hakimyya also help Salafis take decisions on how to act.23 Maher argues that Salafis 
discuss the jurisdictions of “the greater Jihad,” defensive jihad, and other forms to learn 
how to apply them in their everyday life. Takfir (excommunication) is important to 
prevent mistakenly going into shirk (apostasy). Similarly, the concept of al-wala’ wa-l-
bara’ (loyalty to God and the disavowal of what is displeasing to Him) traditionally 
 
17 Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
25. 
18 Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” 41. 
19 Haykel, 36. 
20 Haykel. 
21 Haykel, 35. 
22 Haykel, 40. 
23 Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, 25. 
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existed as an idea related solely to matters of personal conduct and behavior.24 But the 
central pillar of Islam, as Maher and Haykel agree, is tawhid, or monotheism. And 
finally, to some Salafis, the principle of hakimiyya (authority to a set of rules) is 
independent of tawhid (Oneness of God) in a sense that governance is elevated to a level 
of doctrinal significance. Maher distinguishes between activist Salafis who adopt a more 
liberal and tolerant view than Salafi-Jihadis.25 Activists prioritize social order and are 
more flexible about sins committed by rulers compared to their jihadi counterparts.  
Of the five principles, Joas Wagemakers values al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as the 
dominant ideology-based motivator of Salafi Jihadis in particular. Wagemakers argues 
that Ibn Taymiyya uses this concept as a means to fight bida’ (heresy), and that Sulayman 
ibn ‘Abdallah Al al-Sheikh, the grandson of Mohammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, develops it 
a step forward as a tool against kufr (unbelief).P25F26 P Other Islamic scholars such as Hamd 
ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Atiq and Abu Mohamad Al-Maqdisi use this principle to justify takfir since 
they equate adhering to un-Islamic laws with worship, leading to sinful wala’, that should 
be countered with bara’, and hence the rulers of the Muslim world should be the target of 
this disavowal. P26F27 P As such, jihadi groups have used this principle in their doctrine to 
justify the use of violence and get approval from their followers. 
Other scholars, although not removing the effect of ideology, put more emphasis 
on the political context in which Salafis live to explain their actions. This approach seems 
to be more applicable to Salafi Jihadis than other Salafi groups. According to Walter, the 
“level of competition, a group’s local support network, and the institutional constraints on 
state power” directly influence what ideology the group adopts, and especially, it defines 
the level of extremism.28  
 
24 Maher, 122. 
25 Maher, 206. 
26 Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept,” 87. 
27 Wagemakers, 95. 
28 Barbara Walter, The Extremist’s Advantage in Civil Wars (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), 34. 
8 
In looking at Islamist groups in general, Hegghammer suggests five rationales to 
conceptualize the violent and non-violent forms.29 According to him, Islamists’ actions 
are either “State-oriented, Nation-oriented, Umma-oriented, Morality-oriented, or 
sectarian.”30 By suggesting that Islamists shape their strategy and identify their priorities 
by adopting a dominant rationale, and that this defines the form and direction of its 
violence, Hegghammer weighs politics over religion.  
2. Alternative Approach to Salafism 
State intervention and sponsorship of insurgent groups is evident in a lot of recent 
civil wars. No less important than the ideology and politics is the role of regional 
sponsors and external funding. Salafi groups often get funding from private or state 
sponsors. This suggests that the donors expect to have an influence on the decisions of 
those groups. According to Anne Marie Baylouny and Creighton Mullins, outcomes of 
external financing vary depending on “types of resources, sponsor actions and 
preferences, methods of delivery, and structure of the opposition group.”31 The authors 
present a case study on the Farouq Brigade, the most effective fighting force of the Free 
Syrian Army. In its early days, the Farouq Brigade presented a “secular, nationalist 
agenda and appealed to Syrians regardless of sect”; yet, it gradually switched its face 
after the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar started financing the opposition.32 The 
leaders of the group grew Salafi-style beards and changed the logo of the group to a 
“black flag with crossed swords commonly seen among jihadist groups.”33 The Syrian 
experience demonstrated groups’ ideological alignment with funding sources. 
 
29 Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of 
Militant Islamism” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijir (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014), 259, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001. 
30 Hegghammer. 
31 Anne Marie Baylouny and Creighton A. Mullins, Cash is King: Financial Sponsorship and 
Changing Priorities in the Syrian Civil War, Studies in Conflict Terrorism, August 25, 2017, 4. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56079. 
32 Baylouny and Mullins, 8. 
33 Baylouny and Mullins. 
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The initial funding of state sponsors, however, does not necessarily translate to 
total submission from the sponsored group. Hence, state sponsors often search for groups 
in their early emergence. Moreover, Henning Tamm argues that external sponsors prefer 
to bankroll groups or individuals who resemble their ideological preferences.34 This 
funding is not permanent as rebel leaders and state sponsors might switch with time, 
leading the rebels to harm the sponsors’ interests. In response, sponsors redirect funding 
to support a “leader’s internal rival.”35 Lee Seymour presents three case studies (the split 
of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in 1991, Gordon Kong’s faction of the South 
Sudan Defense Force in 2005, and Minni Minawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Army 
in Darfur during 2006) that provide evidence on groups frequently changing loyalty 
based on funding sources.36  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The aforementioned literature review suggests at least three hypotheses for 
studying Lebanon’s Salafi movement. 
Hypothesis 1: Ideological divides motivate the decisions taken by the Lebanese 
Salafi groups.  
To test this hypothesis, this thesis looks into the compatibility between the 
political orientation and the ideological orientation of Lebanon’s Salafis.  
Hypothesis 2: Political considerations are the main motivations that drive 
decision-making among the leaders of Lebanese Salafi groups; they revise their 
ideologies continuously to achieve specific political objectives. 
To test this hypothesis, this thesis explores the evolution of political decisions and 
their congruence with prior Salafi ideology. 
 
34 Henning Tamm, “Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources: How State Sponsors 
Affect Insurgent Cohesion,” in International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 4 (December 2016): 599–610. 
35 Tamm, 599. 
36 Lee Seymour, “Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in 
Sudan,” Internal Securities 39, no.2 (2014): 92−131, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00179.2014. 
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Hypothesis 3: The role of state and non-state sponsors is more influential to the 
Lebanese Salafi decision-makers than the ideological ideas to which they adhere. 
I test this hypothesis by comparing the compatibility between the interests of 
external sponsors and the actions of the related sponsored Lebanese Salafi group. I expect 
to see decisions that violate the groups’ ideological preferences to the benefit of their 
external sponsors. Additionally, I expect to observe Salafi groups that share a common 
ideology but have distinct state sponsors competing and fighting with one another. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The unit of analysis is the influential players in the Lebanese Salafi organizations. 
The thesis looks into a few players through the lens of a case study of North Lebanon and 
Tripoli, in particular. Tripoli long enjoyed the advantage of a stable, Sunni-supported 
environment unlike in the cities of Saida and Beirut where Sunnis coexisted with the 
Maronites, Shi’ites, and the Druze. Tripoli was prosperous because of European 
missionaries, the advanced transportation system, and the port. After the peace agreement 
between Egypt and Israel in 1979, al-Azhar University restricted its scholarships from 
students coming from Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon because those countries opposed 
Anwar El Sadat’s change of policy. Consequently, the Islamic University of Medina 
opened its doors for those students. Upon their return, the Lebanese graduates were to 
transform Salafism from being a marginal group into one of the most important Sunni 
movements. 
Research sources for this thesis encompass both primary and secondary material. 
Primary sources are videos, booklets, and comments from the Salafi preachers. 
Secondary sources include academic books and articles by reputable scholars in both the 
English and Arabic languages. Sources in the two languages are consulted as information 
that is consistent between materials in both languages have more credibility over any 
one-sided story. Other secondary sources include newspapers, speeches, and the author’s 
own experience. These are treated as supplemental information to comment on events 
that are not well expressed in primary and other secondary sources. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
Salafism in Lebanon is a unique case in the Arab world because of the political 
and social circumstances that affected its creation. Since the introduction of the ideology 
in the year 1882 in Beirut by Sheikh Mohammad Abdo, Salafism has evolved and 
fragmented.37 This thesis addresses this issue, trying to shed light on the role of state 
sponsors (Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait) and non-state actors (the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaeda). Central to this thesis is the question: Was the 
ideology of Salafism used to serve political aims or was the politics used to serve the 
ideological aims? The second chapter is devoted to an introduction to Salafism in general 
and the Salafism in Lebanon. After that, Chapter III discusses the influence of the ties 
between Lebanese Salafi groups and state sponsors on the decision-making process of the 
Salafi groups. Chapter IV looks into the respective effect of non-state actors. Finally, the 
Chapter V gives the conclusion, discusses the findings from testing the hypotheses, and 
deduces policy recommendations.  
This thesis design gives a wider understanding of the role of outside actors on 
Lebanese Salafis. The historical dynamics of Salafism globally have been crucial in 
shaping the structure of the Lebanese Salafi scene, which has dense transnational 
linkages, especially to the Arabian Gulf. By looking at the interactions that the Salafis 
had with other players on the Lebanese stage, this thesis can help answer the question of 
how important these state and non-state actors have been to the core of the Lebanese 
Salafis. The fragmentation of the Lebanese Salafis, for example, is part of the 
fragmentation of the Gulf Salafis. And, although other cities have their own independent 
Salafi movements, Tripoli is an ideal case study to understand the interactions between 
many opposing parties. By examining these relationships, this thesis can help find out to 
what extent Salafis in Lebanon might cause instability to the area and to the United 
States’ interests in the region. 
  
 
37 Saoud Al-Mawla, Salafism and New Salafism: From Afghanistan to Lebanon (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar 
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II. THE HISTORY OF SALAFISM IN LEBANON 
Salafism in Lebanon is a unique case in the Arab world because of the political 
and social circumstances that affected its creation. The introduction of the ideology 
started as early as the year 1882 in Beirut with Sheikh Mohammad Abdo.38 The 
movement remained weak and unorganized until Saudis funded the Salafi movement 
created by Sheikh Salim Al Shahhal in Tripoli, Lebanon in 1964. His son and successor, 
Da’i al-Islam, benefited from the Lebanese civil war to grow the militant branch of the 
movement. More recently, the split between Saudi and Kuwaiti Salafis over political 
issues during the 1991 Gulf War had an equivalent split in the Lebanese Salafis. The 
Saudis were mainly supportive of the harakis in Lebanon whereas the Kuwaitis 
exclusively sponsored Lebanese purists.39 Kuwaiti charities funded Sheikh Safwan Al-
Zo’bi to counter the Saudi school run by Sheikh Al Shahhal in Tripoli. Furthermore, the 
Syrian regime aimed to fragment Lebanese Sunnis and thus created the Al-Ahbash 
movement that spread in all Sunni areas to counter Salafism. Ultimately, Sunni-Shi’ite 
differences helped Lebanese Salifis recruit more from the Sunni world because they 
presented themselves as the true fighters for the true religion.  
Relatively few scholars have explored the dynamics of Lebanese Salafism in 
depth. In order to understand how this movement is differentiated and that it cannot be 
quite understood using Western concepts of organizations, it is necessary to provide a 
detailed history and analysis of the movement. This chapter introduces the history of 
Salafism in Lebanon, its geographic and institutional presence in the country, the key 
personalities and ideologues that have shaped the movement, and lastly its fragmentation. 
The chapter discussion sheds light on the official start of the movement as a purist faction 
under Sheikh Salim al-Shahhal in 1964 in Tripoli, and how it splintered into multiple 
schools and organizations affected by the political agendas of the Gulf, mainly those of 
the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Qataris.  
 
38 Saoud Al-Mawla, Salafism and New Salafism, 237. 
39 Pall, Salafism in Lebanon, 88. 
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A. THE EARLY RISE OF SALAFISM IN LEBANON 
Before the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), Salafis were limited in numbers and 
unable to expand. According to Saoud al-Mawla, after Sheikh Mohammad Abdo was 
exiled from Egypt in 1882, he started religious study sessions at al-Himade’s house in 
Msaytbeh District, Beirut.40 This played a big role in spreading the Salafi ideology. Out 
of the four madahib (schools of Islamic jurisprudence), the Lebanese mostly follow 
Muhammad bin Idris al-Shafi’i. On the other hand, Saida’s sheikhs mostly follow Abu 
Hanifa. Followers of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal do not exist in Lebanon except for those who 
graduated from Saudi Arabia’s schools. Up until 1945, Tripoli had four Islamic 
institutions.41 In 1946, Sheikh Salim al-Shahhal founded “Shabab Muhamad,” which was 
later called “Muslimoun.”42 “Muslimoun” was the first public Islamic movement in 
Tripoli; it called for “promotion of virtue and prevention of vice,” with some enforcing 
actions.43 With the rise of Nasserism in the mid-1950s, however, “Muslimoun” degraded 
significantly. Salafis lacked sufficient funding and a distinguished ideology; moreover, 
they could not compete with Nasserism that was attracting the youth. After Sheikh Salim 
al-Shahhal returned once again from Saudi Arabia in 1964, he founded the Salafi 
Movement in Tripoli. He sent his three sons, Da’i al-Islam, Radi, and Abu Baker, to learn 
Shari’a in Medina, Saudi Arabia. With Sheikh Salim getting older, his son Da’i al-Islam 
led the movement, representing the second phase of the movement, militant Salafism. In 
the early years of the 1970s, Da’i al-Islam started the Islamic Army to fight all non-
Islamic trends gaining ground in Tripoli.  
An important factor in the transformation of Salafism into a militant movement 
was the creation of the Islamic Unification Movement (IUM) that controlled Tripoli from 
1982 until 1985. The Left, consisting mainly of Lebanese Communist Party or other 
radical Marxist groups, attracted Tripoli’s Sunni youth because of the uneven distribution 
 
40 Al-Mawla, Salafism and New Salafism, 237. 
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42 Al-Mawla, Salafism and New Salafism, 276. 
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of wealth in the country until the beginning of the 1980s.44 Without a viable alternative, 
the inhabitants of Tripoli once again returned to focusing on religious practices. The 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the withdrawal of the PLO led to the decline of 
the Leftist movement and expansion of the Sunni religious movement. At the same time, 
the success of the Iranian revolution gave credibility to Islamists who had upheld the 
possibility of establishing an Islamic state in the region.45 Under these conditions, the 
charismatic Sheikh Saeed Sha’ban founded IUM after leaving the Muslim Brotherhood 
because of a disagreement on methodology. The IUM took control of Tripoli and North 
Lebanon in 1982 with material support from the PLO and the Iranian Republic; Sa’id 
Sha’ban announced the founding of an Islamic emirate in the North. During its three-year 
reign, IUM lost popular support because of the terrorism it practiced (in 1983 IUM 
fighters killed dozens of members of the Lebanese Communist Party), the internal 
schisms, and its lack of a unified ideological direction. The movement ended when the 
Syrian Army that had been occupying Lebanon since 1976 managed to defeat it militarily 
in 1985.  
After the collapse of the IUM’s mini-state, different players in the Sunni religious 
community tried to fill the vacuum; Salafis gradually filled the space. Tripoli long 
enjoyed the advantage of a stable, Sunni-supported environment unlike in Saida and 
Beirut where Sunnis coexisted with the Maronite, Shi’ites, and the Druze. Tripoli was 
also prosperous because of European missionaries, an advanced transportation system, 
and the port. After the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979, al-Azhar 
University restricted its scholarships from students coming from Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon because those countries opposed Anwar El Sadat’s change of policy. In 
response, the Islamic University of Medina opened its doors for them. Upon their return, 
the Lebanese graduates were to transform Salafism from being a marginal group into one 
of the most important Sunni movements.46 In the 1980s, many Lebanese Sunnis 
converted to Islamism after the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood and the invasion of 
 
44 Pall, Salafism in Lebanon, 68. 
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Israel in 1982. Salafis benefited from the weakening of the traditional religious elite, the 
failure of the Muslim Brotherhood’s type of Islamism, and the appearance of wealthy 
sponsors from the Gulf countries to strengthen their positions. 
With funding from the Gulf and a vacuum in the religious space, Salafis 
strengthened their grip in Tripoli. In 1988, Sheikh Da’i al-Islam Al Shahal created GCS 
with Saudi money to cover Sunni needs in the social and educational domains. The 
Islamic Group (IG) filled some of these gaps, but that group started to decline soon after 
the Ta’if Agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war was reached. The group mainly 
declined because it did not carry a clear agenda, differences arose between pro- and anti-
Syrian wings, and activists—such as Sheikh Sa’d al-Din Kibbi—left the group to create 
their own independent group. Finally, Palestinian members left to join Hamas. The 
deterioration of the IG’s presence on the Sunni religious front created opportunities for 
Salafis to accumulate religious capital by appearing as the righteous few who sincerely 
care about Islam by providing religious services for Muslims.47  
After the Lebanese Civil War, the Syrian regime considered the Christian 
Lebanese Forces and the PLO a more dangerous threat than the Salafis. Syrian and 
Lebanese intelligence believed that any threat coming from the Salafi community could 
be countered by the presence of many informants among the movement’s followers. They 
believed that the ties between the Lebanese Forces and Israel were troubling, and the 
Arab World’s sympathy for the PLO legitimized them in the eyes of Muslims. The Syrian 
regime countered both by presenting themselves as the last Arab regional power capable 
of protecting the Muslim community. A vital function of Muslim religious leaders—
Sunnis and Shi’ites alike—was to systematically transform the question of Syrian-
Lebanese relations, when it was raised, into one of inter-Lebanese relations, thereby 
preventing the creation of a national coalition directed against Syria.48  
Around 1990, Da’i al-Islam al-Shahhal returned to Tripoli from Saudi Arabia, and 
the Syrians allowed him to increase his influence in Tripoli because they wanted the 
 
47 Pall, Salafism in Lebanon, 71. 
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Sunnis fragmented. With funding from Saudi Arabia, Da’i al-Islam developed his own 
group operating in almost every Sunni region. Manar Magazine published by Mohamad 
Rasheed Rida and Fateh Magazine by Moheb Deen Khatib also supported the spread of 
Salafism in the early 1990s.49 One of the ways to know the dominance of an Islamic 
movement is to see how many mosques it controls. In 1990s Tripoli, out of 110 mosques, 
40 mosques were controlled by Dar al-Fatwa, 40 by Salafis, and 30 by different other 
movements such as al-Ahbash, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, and al-Tabligh.50 This was 
beneficial for the Syrian regime as a convenient way to keep a solid grip and to 
manipulate the Lebanese Sunni domain. 
In 1983, Syrian intelligence allowed the Ethiopian Sheikh Abdallah al-Hirari to 
head the “Islamic Society for Charitable Works” movement, known as al-Ahbash, in 
order to counter Salafism. Through militia tactics that blended brutality and intimidation, 
the Ahbash in the 1980s seized the mosques of Burj Abu Haidar, Zuqqat al-Blat, and 
Basta Fawqa in the capital’s western neighborhoods, imposing their own interpretation of 
the sacred texts and ousting Dar al-Fatwa’s legally appointed Sheikhs.51 They spread in 
all Sunni regions, leading to clashes with Salafis. Ahbash’s main competitors were the 
Muslim Brothers (Jama’a al-Islamiya) and the Salafis. Ultimately, another militant 
group, in the Ain al-Hilwa Palestinian refugee camp in Saida, Usbat al-Ansar, murdered 
the head of the al-Ahbash organization Sheikh Nizar al-Halabi on August 31, 1995. The 
Lebanese judiciary accused Abu Mihjin, the “brains” behind the operation, condemning 
him to death in absentia on January 17, 1997.52 The tribunal also issued death sentences 
to three Islamists among the five men arrested, and they were hanged in the courtyard of 
Rumiyyeh Prison on March 24, 1997.53 At the same time, the Syrian regime and its 
representatives in Lebanon used the event to crackdown on the entire Salafi movement. 
The Lebanese judiciary ordered the closure of GCS, a charitable and educational 
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organization directed by Da’i al-Islam al-Shahhal, in 1996 arguing that al-Shahhal’s 
network was spreading extremist ideas.54 In addition, the state’s ulamas (religious 
scholars) were not allowed to provide religious expertise in defining the organization 
Halabi headed, which would have legitimized his execution and made it possible to 
emphasize the apostasy of al-Ahbash.55 This conveyed a feeling that the trial was a 
parody of justice. 
After this incident, the Salafis gained legitimacy as the defenders of Sunnis in the 
face of the “deviant” teachings of al-Ahbash. Al-Ahbash used the theme of takfir to 
counter anyone who dared challenge their teachings. The struggle therefore prompted an 
intensification of Sunni identity and gave rise to militant solidarities with new political 
affiliations. In the early 1990s, young Palestinians from the Muslim Student Union tried 
to counter al-Ahbash takfir ideology inside the Palestinian camps by explaining the 
doctrine of Sheikh Halabi’s organization and its deviant character in relation to Sunni 
orthodoxy. Trained Sheikhs in Ain al-Helweh’s mosques provided an audience that had 
not mastered the core of Islamic texts with the intellectual instruments necessary to upend 
the Ahbash’s religious posturing and contest the organization’s dialectics. Hasan al-
Qatarji, a Lebanese Sheikh who taught hadith sciences at Dar al-Fatwa’s Faculty of 
Islamic Law in Lebanon, gave a lecture at al-Nur Mosque in Ain al-Helweh on the 
dangers inherent in rashly using takfir; he explained the conditions for its valid use as 
established in Islamic history.56  
B. INTERNAL SPLITS IN LEBANESE SALAFISM 
Since the 1990s, Tripoli’s Salafis have been divided into two main schools: 
harakis represented by Da’i al-Islam al-Shahhal and purists represented by Safwan Al-
Zo’bi and Hasan al-Shahhal. Since the founding of Salafism Movement by Sheikh Salim 
al-Shahal, his family dominated Tripoli. In 1990, Saudi charities and the Kuwaiti 
Jama’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage—
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SRIH) both supported GCS. In 1997, the leadership of SRIH became purist, and so SRIH 
cut off the funds from all haraki organizations. A young sheikh, Safwan al-Zo’bi, created 
the Islamic Heritage Endowment and got his funds from the Kuwaiti SRIH.57 SRIH’s 
main intention was to create a strong purist stream of followers in the country to 
counterbalance the harakis. For that, they managed to fund charities of Dr. Hassan al-
Shahhal, director of Ma’had al-Da’wa wal-l-Irshad (Call and Guidance College) and the 
cousin of Da’i al-Islam.  
Notably, the Lebanese militants who led the Diniyeh insurrection in 2000 
developed their political and religious identity outside Lebanon and, more generally, 
outside the Middle Eastern religious scene and the global Arab political system.58 The 
leader of the Sir al-Diniyeh group, Basim al-Kanj (Abu Aisha), traveled between the 
United States and Lebanon; he spent some time in Afghanistan where he was radicalized 
and was convinced of the importance of an Islamic caliphate. He had some ties with 
Usbat al-Ansar in the Ain el-Helwe camp although the two groups had different history, 
experience, and political trajectories. The feeling of participating in a holy war in the 
mountains of Diniyeh mobilized Muslims of Palestinian origin just as it did Muslims of 
Lebanese nationality. While the “state of Hezbollah” has been able to develop its 
“Islamic society” outside—or, rather, beside—state institutions, the Islamicized segments 
of the Sunni community have not been given the same right, even in those regions 
neglected by the Lebanese state since independence.59 Basim remarkably recruited young 
people and formed a strong group that aimed to build an independent Islamic emirate in 
Sir al-Dineyeh, equivalent to the “state of Hezbollah.” His strong connection with Usbat 
al-Ansar helped him train his militants, fund his group, and recruit new members to his 
group. 
Basim al-Kanj’s group clashed with the Lebanese Army on New Year’s Eve 
2000, losing the battle in one week. Basim ordered his men to take over a building in the 
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village of Assoun, North Lebanon, that housed the radio station of al-Hidaya, a Salafi 
association that had been disbanded. To control the situation, Islamist figures from 
Tripoli and the surrounding region, among them Sheikh Da’i al-Islam al-Shahal, 
approached the Jama’a Islamiyya deputy Khalid Dahir and asked him to mediate between 
the armed groups and the Lebanese Army. The efforts did not work, and after a few 
clashes, the Lebanese Army overcame the last stronghold of the movement on January 3, 
2000.  
After the Diniyeh events, the Syrian authorities changed their policy on Islamism 
and attempted to exercise stricter control over the various radical Sunni movements. They 
saw a threat in radical Sunni groups that could rally anti-Syrian mobilization, and the 
Syrian authorities wanted to keep the Christians feeling threatened and in need of Syrian 
protection. The authorities reactivated Sunni militias that they—and AMAL, the Shi’ite 
group headed by Nabih Berri—had eliminated in the mid-1980s, as long as the groups 
legitimized Syria’s actions.60 In early 2000, the Syrians released from jail Hashim 
Minqara, the former Tawhid emir of the Mina of Tripoli, to challenge Bilal Sha’ban, the 
son of Sheikh Sa’id, over the leadership of the movement.61 They gave credibility to the 
little known Union of Akkar Ulama to counter Maronite authorities. When an assembly 
of Maronite bishops published a document denouncing the effects of Syria’s presence in 
Lebanon at the political and economic levels, the members of the Union strongly 
criticized the patriarch’s position, accusing him of serving Israeli interests and of 
pursuing “isolationist” projects.  
Hence, Salafis in Lebanon were relatively unified up until the second half of the 
1990s when they fragmented for three reasons. The first factor, mentioned earlier, was 
that the Syrian regime dissolved the GCS in 1996 through the pro-Syrian Lebanese 
authorities, accusing the organization of inciting sectarian hatred.62 Students of Sheikh al-
Shahhal created various Sunni Movements and worked to gain Sunni acceptance. They 
found hosts ready to fund their agenda. Da’i al-Islam al-Shahhal was linked to the 
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Diniyeh group. After the battle in January 2000, many members of the organization were 
arrested, and Sheikh Da῾i fled to Saudi Arabia to escape possible prosecution.63 The 
second factor that led to the split of the Salafi movement was the fragmentation of Saudi 
Arabia Salafis, especially after the war in Iraq in 1991, and the purist state ulama 
legitimization of the American presence on Saudi Arabian soil. Since many Lebanese 
Salafis studied in Saudi Arabia and all of them had contacts with the Gulf countries, they 
did not remain unaffected by the aforementioned debates. The third and last factor was 
the drying up of Saudi financial sources following the 9/11 terror attacks and the 
subsequent “war on terror.” Owing to American pressure after the September attacks, the 
Saudi government restricted the rights of al-Haramayn to support Salafi groups in foreign 
countries and then closed the institution altogether in 2004.64 Consequently, Lebanese 
Salafis started searching for other sources of funding and split apart depending on the 
charity that funded them. 
Syrian occupation ended on April 10, 2005, only a few months after a car bomb 
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and 21 others in Beirut, for which 
many blamed the Syrian regime.  Demonstrations by Christians, Sunnis, and Druze 
immediately followed that event. The Syrians’ departure marked the relaxation of the 
tight security control over Salafis and the security services’ pressure on haraki, in 
particular. As a result, al-Ahbash’s influence declined and many followers changed heart 
because of the Ahbash’s close ties to Syria. Charges against Da’i al-Islam al-Shahhal 
were dropped and he returned to Lebanon. Meanwhile, Salafis cooperated with the al-
Hariri clan to gain funding for their charity networks in return for the votes of their 
followers in the elections. 
In terms of structure, transnational purist networks are generally more hierarchical 
than the haraki ones. The great Islamic scholars of the Gulf possess significant religious 
authority over the Lebanese purists. The Lebanese fatwa council that consists of local 
scholars issues independent legal opinions only when the fatwas of the Saudi great ulama 
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are not specific enough to the local circumstances. On the other hand, haraki 
transnational networks are much more horizontal. They regard this domination of great 
scholars in the Lebanese purist network as a distortion of the teaching of Islam, which 
advocates the individual freedom of the learned to interpret the Text.65 In Sheikh Salim 
al-Rafi’i’s opinion, local Salafi Sheikhs can also be highly knowledgeable and almost 
certainly have deeper insights into what is going on in their own community and their 
country.66  
Just as the structures of the purist and the haraki Salafi factions differ, so does the 
structure of their respective transnational links. The different views about the ruler’s role 
are a particular cause of mistrust between these groups, and they disparagingly label each 
other “innovators” or murji’a.67 Both purist and haraki Lebanese Salafis extend their 
networks in the direction of the Arabian Gulf, mainly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, to 
improve their religious knowledge and acquire funds. The learning occurs at the level of 
the Sheikhs or among active followers; passive followers rarely interact with outer 
sources. For Sheikhs, network ties can emerge in the early years of studying Shari’a, or 
through formal and informal encounters between Sheikhs in Salafi events. Committed 
Lebanese Salafis often interact with visiting Salafis from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, or in 
online communities based on shared ideology. Funds from Gulf-based charities are vital 
for the survival of the Salafi networks. As stated earlier, since 1997, SRIH has only 
sponsored purists whereas the Qatari Sheikh’s Aid Charity Foundation (SACF) financed 
the North Lebanese haraki network. After 9/11, charity organizations became more 
careful in distributing money to Salafi networks, and after the Syrian Civil War started in 
2011, they became even more careful about where their money was going in an attempt 
to curb the funding of militant groups in Syria.  
The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon also were not isolated from the Arab 
world’s increased interest in Islamism and Jihadi Salafism. Ain al-Helwe is the largest 
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camp, with more than 80,000 inhabitants in one square kilometer. It operated throughout 
the Syrian occupation as a refuge and a training environment for the people who ran 
away from the Syrian militant actions in the North. Militant groups started openly 
targeting the Lebanese Army believing in the “near enemy then the far enemy” policy of 
Bin Laden. The Lebanese Army was able to stand up against all groups, keeping the 
Jihadi Salafis in the Palestinian camps contained. Perhaps the sharpest encounter was the 
three-month fight of Naher al-Bared refugee camp in Northern Lebanon between the 
Lebanese Army and “Fateh al-Islam,” an offshoot from “Fateh al-Intifada” that was 
linked to the Syrian regime. Clashes started May 20, 2007, when “Fateh al-Islam” 
fighters attacked three Lebanese Army checkpoints and killed a number of soldiers. The 
fight ended on September 2, 2007, with the escape of Shaker al-Absi, the founder of the 
group. The Lebanese Army gained control over Naher al-Bared camp. 
Initially, neither global jihad nor Salafi-Jihadism had popular traction in Lebanon. 
Sheikh Abdallah Azzam’s call for global jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, with the tacit 
or explicit encouragement of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, fell virtually 
on deaf ears in Lebanon.68 The emergence of the al-Haraka al-Islamiyah al-Mujahida (the 
Islamic Jihad Movement) in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Helweh by Sheikh 
Ibrahim Ghunaym was a call for jihad against the Zionists in view of the Arab defeats of 
1967 and 1973. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PLO defenses 
quickly broke, whereas Sheikh Ghunaym’s student Hisham Shraydi held the front for 20 
days, giving legitimacy to the resistance. He was radicalized by Imam Hassan Zaghmut 
who introduced him to the ideas of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of Muslim 
Brotherhood.69 Shraydi formally established his movement in 1986, naming it Usbat al-
Ansar. Consequently, the brutal Syrian suppression of the IUM in Tripoli led them to find 
refuge with Usbat al-Ansar. Usbat al-Ansar acted on its ideology by imposing its 
fundamentalist view of Islamic creedal principles on Palestinian society and making jihad 
(armed struggle) a focal point of its militant activism against idolatrous societies and rule. 
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Though quietist Salafis have frowned upon the confrontational discourse and takfiri 
rhetoric of haraki Salafis, their efforts to unite Salafis and oppose takfir ideology have 
thus far not succeeded. The strong belief championed by harakis that Sunnis have been 
turned into lambs for slaughter has prevailed among most Sunnis. 
Sunni-Shi’ite tensions have given the Salafis an opportunity to reach a larger 
Sunni audience. The dominance of the Shi’ite parties AMAL and Hezbollah over the 
Sunni majority has led to many recruits to Salafism. Since the start of the Arab Spring 
and the Syrian revolution of 2011, which was accompanied by increasing Sunni-Shi’i 
sectarianism, many Lebanese Sunnis have started to associate themselves with 
Salafism.70 Sheikh Ahmad Al Asir’s movement in Saida was a proof of the escalation of 
the Lebanese Sunni mindset toward political radical non-Jihadi Salafism, a new 
classification unlike the organizations before.71 Al Asir based his movement on the 
oppression that the Sunnis felt due to the actions of Hezbollah and AMAL, which 
resonated with many Sunnis who shared the same beliefs but did not act to challenge it. 
After the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Al Asir raised his voice because he saw 
the rise of Sunnis in Syria as a game changer, and that Islamists could now directly 
challenge Iran and Hezbollah. He lost a battle against the Lebanese Army, however, and 
the Lebanese General Security caught him in Beirut International Airport two years later 
while he was trying to run away with a fake passport and a shaved beard.  
Various attempts to unite the Sunni Salafis have not been successful. Motivated 
by their desire to unite and stand as the guardians of the Sunni community, Salafis look to 
a hadith by Prophet Muhammad that “the hand of God is with the group” as the 
overriding principle to surmount their factionalism.72 This did not resonate with the 
events in the Middle East and, in particular, the Syrian Civil War. Harakis have 
continued to criticize the state and the purist Salafis. The suppression of al-Assir and the 
assassination attempts on Sheikh al-Rafi’i and Sheikh Baroudi in Tripoli assured that the 
harakis would not back down.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
As described in this chapter, Salafism in Lebanon may be considered as an 
extension of transnational Salafism; nevertheless, Salafism in Lebanon has developed 
within a domestic context heavily influenced by regional ideologies and politics. It is, in 
fact, very much alive and even growing among Sunni Muslims in the country. The reason 
the Gulf is so important to Lebanon is that while Saudi Arabia supported the purists, the 
tendency among Kuwaiti and Qatari Salafis was to create space for the harakis. This led 
to both trends developing regional and even global networks of charity, influence, and 
support. Nevertheless, Salafis in Lebanon rely more on informal ties than institutional 
ones, which helps them survive repression by the Lebanese security services. This 
chapter has explored three schools of Salafism—quietist, activist, and Salafi-Jihadist—
that are, more or less, in line with the transnational networks of Salafism whose roots go 
back to the theological and ideological development of Salafism in Saudi Arabia. Salafis, 
even though they have different and even conflicting ideologies, share a common aim to 
purify Islam from intruding ideas and to establish an ideal Islamic society. Hence, 
Salafism constitutes a theological and realistic challenge to the plural society of Lebanon 
and to the region. Most likely, the importance of Salafism in Lebanon lies in the 
movement’s ability to shape the religious identity of the regular Lebanese Sunni believers 
and not in its potential to launch armed action. 
The next chapter considers the actions of Salafi decision makers in relation to the 
pressure from state sponsors. Rich states have always showed an interest in foreign 
organizations for various reasons; states might want to spread their religion, culture, or 
influence. The chapter mainly considers Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar’s 
favored Salafi organizations, and the influence of their decisions, if any, to favor the 
interests of those countries. At the same time, the next chapter looks into the political and 
ideological aspects of the organizations’ decision-making. Changes in ideology or 
political pursuits to favor the donor-state’s vision will favor hypothesis three. It is true 
that states look for organizations most closely aligned with their ideology, but at some 
point along the way, a difference in vision might arise between the organizations’ leaders 
and their sponsors.   
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III. DECISION-MAKING IN LEBANESE ISLAMISTS GROUPS 
WITH STATE SPONSORS 
Different states have played major roles in shaping and developing Islamic 
currents to strengthen their position in the Arab and Muslim world. A general take-away 
is that a regime’s international influence and thus its survival has been the main motivator 
for states to fund organizations outside their borders and intervene in the shaping of their 
ideologies and policies. In the economically struggling suburbs of Tripoli and in 
Palestinian refugee camps, Salafism emerged as a social movement and “an alternative to 
anomie and gang crime for excluded and unemployed youths.”73 During the Lebanese 
civil war (1975−1990), Syria exploited its physical military presence to influence and 
contest Salafism. In 1983, the Syrian intelligence allowed, if not ordered, the Ethiopian 
Sheikh Abdallah al-Hirari to head al-Ahbash, in order to counter Salafism. Attacking the 
PLO in Naher Al-Bared camp in 1983 and crushing the IUM in 1985 were part of the 
Syrian regime’s agenda to make sure that its sectarian grip in Syria was not opposed.  
The return of Da’i al-Islam al-Shahhal in 1990 was the beginning of the rise of 
haraki Salafis backed by Saudi Arabia. His organization GCS kept Salafis together due to 
Sheikh Da’i’s prestige, authority, and financial power.74 With this, Saudi Arabia was 
counterbalancing Iran’s effort to win the hearts and minds of the Sunni population in the 
Middle East. In 1968, Ayatollah Khomeini told Muslims that it was necessary “to help 
PLO’s men fight unbelieving and inhuman Zionism.”75 This gradually declined until the 
Iran-Iraq war in 1980 when the PLO was not a good option as Iran’s ally anymore. 
According to Muhammad Hasan al-Amin, the Iranians wanted full support in the war, 
which the PLO could not give them, and so they created Hezbollah in 1985.76 After 
Syrians banned GCS in 1996 using the Lebanese juridical institutions, purist Salafis 
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expanded their influence. They benefited from the appearance of the two Gulf charities 
SRIH and SACF on the Lebanese scene.77  
Today, Islamic movements in Lebanon count more than twenty powerful 
organizations, each having a political or ideological agenda, and many are not open about 
their sources of funding. The Norwegian political scientist Thomas Hegghammer 
considers Islamist movements to follow four different rationales: socio-revolutionary, 
nationalist, pan-Islamist, or sectarian.78 Since the cost of using violence is too high, the 
number of Lebanese Sunnis who escalated their strong frustration was very limited.79 
This chapter looks at al-Ahbash, funded by Syria; the GSC, funded by Saudi Arabia; and 
the Islamic Heritage Endowment (IHE), funded by Kuwait. The aim is to find out 
whether such organizations change ideologies to mirror the sponsoring state.  
A. ISLAMIC SOCIETY FOR CHARITABLE WORKS (AL-AHBASH) 
There is much controversy surrounding how this organization started, how it built 
its ideology, and how it fits in the Lebanese Islamist community. Some scholars like 
Nizar Hamzeh consider al-Ahbash as a Sufi movement that is spiritually Islamist but not 
politically.80 Others such as Bernard Rougier and Zoltan Pall categorize it more as a 
proxy for the Syrian regime that sought division of the Lebanese Sunnis to consolidate 
Syrian influence in Lebanese politics. To better understand this organization, this 
research looks into three factors: the ideology of the founder of the movement, the 
circumstances in which al-Ahbash strengthened its grip, and the origins of the group’s 
funding. 
The founder’s belief system has a complex structure that incorporates Sufi 
spiritualism with parts of Sunni and Shi’i theology. Sheikh Abdallah al-Hirari, the 
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founder of al-Ahbash, settled in Beirut in 1950 after a journey from Ethiopia to the Hijaz, 
then Jerusalem and Damascus. With that, he developed a moderate and tolerant Islamic 
system that allows pluralism without political activism and the resort to violence against 
the rulers.81 His main aim was to recruit more believers while at the same time 
maintaining political passivity.82 Although Habashi respects the pious ancestors and the 
Shari’a, he might be a possible follower of the “Kalamiya (literalist) tradition of the 
Mu’tazila who stressed the superiority of reason over revelation” because of his emphasis 
on the science of hadith.83 He deemphasizes the importance of Ibn Taymiya as Sheikh al-
Islam, and considers that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and Sayyid Qutb were not figures of 
Islamic authority. 
Al-Ahbash originally had political differences with Salafis and Al-Jama’a al-
Islamiyya that later on evolved into an ideological struggle. The Ahbash started with a 
few hundred members during the civil war and became a large Islamic movement by the 
late 1980s. As mentioned in Chapter II, al-Ahbash followers forcefully took over 
mosques in Beirut defying Dar Al-Fatwa. This was at a time when the Syrian regime had 
the Christian parties and the PLO as their main enemies; it had a need to legitimize its 
intervention in Lebanon. Such mobilization maintained religious tension that allowed 
Syria to act as a permanent regulator of the Lebanese social and political spheres.84 And, 
although the Syrian-favored organization spread all over the world, it was banned in 
Syria. Al-Ahbash did not create its own militia; moreover, it did not take part in sectarian 
violence or any of the conflicts with Israel. It advocated for pluralism and tolerance, a 
moderate alternative to Islamism, which gained the support of many of the Sunni urban 
middle class. The main target of the organization was recruitment and increasing its 
influence. With that call for Islamic pluralism, al-Ahbash organization aggressively 
worked to challenge the doctrine and preaching of other groups.85 The organization also 
 
81 Nizar Hamzeh and Hrair Dekmejian, A Sufi Response to Political Islamism: Al-Ahbash of Lebanon, 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5. 
82 Hamzeh and Dekmejian. 
83 Hamzeh, “Islamism in Lebanon,” 51. 
84 Rogier, Everyday Jihad, 261. 
85 Hamzeh and Dekmejian, “A Sufi Response to Political Islamism,” 5. 
30 
wanted to influence the ballot box and the street battles. On the ideological level, it 
attacked the founder of Wahhabism, Mohammad Ben AbdulWahab (1703–1791), who 
Salafis consider a source of historical inspiration. Moreover, it lambasted Ibn Taymiyyah 
(1263–1328), one of the prominent Hanbali jurists, who is well respected among Salafis 
and modern Islamist currents. They also brutally criticized Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), a 
Muslim Brotherhood ideologue influencing an entire generation of Islamists. Moreover, 
al-Ahbash adopted many Sufi ideas and practices, which the Salafi groups consider to be 
heretical and acts of blasphemy. As a result, the differences between them now extend 
from politics all the way to ideology. The two sides have frequently exchanged 
accusations of treachery, heresy, and deviation from religion.86  
Although it is hard to trace the funding of al-Ahbash, the organization most 
probably takes money from the Syrian regime or individuals who pay allegiance to Syria. 
According to its leaders, sympathizers and members donate to the organization; this sort 
of funding is what keeps the association alive.87 The hierarchal organization of al-
Ahbash, and the organized way in which it took control over strategic mosques in Beirut 
suggest that a godfather sponsors the organization. The opposition from Dar al-Fatwa did 
not affect the organization and it continued to operate without a license. Furthermore, the 
Syrian regime hunted most Islamist groups forcing them to go underground at the time 
when it fully supported al-Ahbash. The benefits of an ideology of seeing Syria as the only 
representative of Muslims was priceless for the Syrian regime since it could not easily 
face a united Sunni front. Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya (JI) and Harakat al-Tawheed openly 
accused the Syrian regime of helping to create al-Ahbash as a “tool to fight other Islamist 
forces.”88 Evidence shows, in fact, that the Syrians encouraged al-Abash to improve their 
influence by occupying mosques in Beirut and Tripoli.89 
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Whether created by the Syrian regime or just exploited by it, al-Ahbash shows 
deviation from the Sufi traditions to better blend in the Lebanese political system. With 
the high Lebanese regard for religious pluralism, Sufism had special strength as the 
Ahbash narrative shows.90 In such cases, modernization and industrialization were not 
able to cause the Sufi orders to decline. Followers managed to pull bloody fights against 
JI and other Islamists while supporting Syria as the true defender of Muslims and 
avoiding any fights with Israel. Their adaptation is most probably based on political 
reasons; al-Ahbash sought a more significant role in the Lebanese politics and hence 
adapted their teachings to accommodate a wider range of Muslims.  
B. GUIDANCE AND CHARITY SOCIETY (GCS) 
The Salafi movement started with Sheikh Salem al-Shahhal in 1946; it has 
developed into a movement of approximately 50 organizations operating as religious 
schools and non-profit organizations, mostly in North Lebanon.91 The sub-organizations 
related to al-Shahhal are Wahhabi-inspired; their scholars graduate from Saudi Arabia’s 
religious schools with hardline Wahhabi ideology. Originally, the mainstream Lebanese 
Salafi organizations were quietists who claim to “seek reform without resorting to 
violence, renouncing violence as an instrument of social and political change.”92 Over 
time, however, the harakis began to improve their position and convert purists upon the 
return of about “fifty Lebanese graduates of the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi 
Arabia.”93 In 1990, the movement operated through the GCS, who aimed to reform 
society, help those in need, and build educational and religious facilities such as mosques 
and schools. They functioned under the authority of Sheikh Salem’s son Da’i al-Islam, 
gradually transforming them more closely into harakis since the Saudi Sahwa movement 
affected him and many other Lebanese Sheikhs. Salafis portrayed themselves as the 
resistance to the Shia “threat” and as savors of Sunnis. The haraki Salafi organization 
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SRIH openly supported GCS up until 1997.94 Upon his return to Lebanon in 1990, al-
Shahhal received from SRIH “hundreds of thousands of dollars, likely in excess of $1 
million, to establish religious colleges in Tripoli.”95 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the Syrian regime cracked down on the organization 
in 1996. After Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination in February 2005 and the 
following rapid Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005, Salafis gained power and 
mobilized in coordination with the Future Movement. Hariri’s death created a sense of 
victimization that, added to the hatred of and hostility against the Syrian regime, led 
Salafis to vote for Hariri’s endorsed candidates; Salafis turned a blind eye to the fact that 
the list included figures from the Lebanese Forces, “the party of the extreme right-wing 
Christian wartime militia.”96 In general, Lebanese Salafis have stayed away from 
Lebanese politics, following their initial ideology. They were inactive during the tenure 
of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, but later on they indulged into politics as everyone else 
siding with the March 14 movement.  
An issue that was highly disputed was how Salafis got their funds. Perhaps the 
Hariri supported the Salafis in hope of buying their loyalties. This might have been a plan 
by the Hariri to mobilize Sunni fighters in any confrontation with Hezbollah; at the same 
time, this explains Saudi Arabia’s control over Salafis. Al-Shahhal undeniably got 
funding from Gulf organizations, encouraged by their states, to start his movement. With 
the split of the Gulf States, Da’i al-Islam remained loyal to the harakis and hence kept 
receiving the Saudi funding. Kuwait’s turn toward purist Salafis led to the loss of funding 
from SRIH to the GCS. At a later stage, the Arab Spring was a boost for the Gulf-
supported harakis to increase their grip because of the continuous support that the Arab 
leaders got from the purists. 
Even though Salafis had a hard time selling the idea of collaboration with parties 
that go against their ideology, they managed to mobilize their followers by presenting al-
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Hariri as the protector of Sunnis in Lebanon. Moreover, al-Shahhal, due to constant 
unrest with the JI, accused the group of “wanting to control all other Islamist groups and 
speak in their name.”97 This provoked the already high tensions between Islamist groups 
such as the JI and the Salafis. One explanation for that outside the ideology is the global 
tension between the Saudi axis on one hand and the Muslim brotherhood on the other that 
transferred the political tensions into Lebanese groups. Meanwhile, Salafi leaders have 
refused to admit that the Hariri funds them, insisting that “the funds mainly come from 
sympathetic individuals and associations in the Gulf, rather than from state 
organizations.”98 
C. ISLAMIC HERITAGE ENDOWMENT (IHE) 
As mentioned earlier, purists in the North flourished with the changes in the 
Kuwaiti SRIH that decreased the role of harakis.99 After SRIH stopped funding the GCS 
and started searching for more convenient organizations to support, purists gained the 
upper hand. In addition, the crackdown against haraki Salafis by the Syrian-influenced 
Lebanese authorities in the 1990s played a role in their rise. Moreover, the Lebanese 
Salafis lost resources and leadership after the Diniyeh fight with the Lebanese Army. 
They searched for other potential donors; they contacted several charities in the Gulf who 
previously supported al-Shahhal. The Lebanese purists who were marginalized by the 
GCS reconnected with the SRIH for financial support. Support was marginal in view of 
the Syrian regime crackdown on all Salafi groups; yet with the withdrawal of the Syrian 
forces in 2005, SRIH opened a branch in Tripoli and “became the dominant sponsor of 
the purists in Lebanon.”100 The SRIH financed the newly created IHE, which consisted of 
several Salafi organizations in the North, mainly in Tripoli. “Under the leadership of the 
relatively young Sheikh Safwan al-Zaabi, the IHE became the backbone of the emerging 
purist faction in North Lebanon.”101 Several sheikhs from Tripoli and the surrounding 
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areas signed an agreement, prepared by al-Zaabi, providing them with money from 
funders of the IHE, on condition that they follow a set of rules.102 First, they should stay 
loyal to the Saudi great ulama and not mock them. Second, despite injustices perpetrated 
by the rulers, Islamic society should be created by peaceful means. By that, the document 
prevents jihad that militant groups call for and ensures that the followers abide by the 
rules set by the rulers, even if those rulers are not Muslims. Hence, the agreement 
supports all means of coexisting with the Christians. In view of the SRIH after their shift 
to purists, these points reflect their preferences.103 In addition to that, the IHE created a 
fatwa council that included highly respected Salafi figures. One fatwa, for example, 
allowed for participation in elections. To the clerics justifying this fatwa, “participating in 
the election of representatives to parliament is legitimate, since Lebanese law does not 
oblige them to make decisions that are un-Islamic.”104 Al-Zaabi gained benefits from the 
candidates in exchange for support from IHE followers and supporters at the ballots. The 
winners in elections had an obligation to provide jobs and other services for purist 
Salafis. At the same time, the network that started with the small branch of SRIH in 
Tripoli expanded to more villages. This was possible with the increased ability of the IHE 
in recruiting more voters and hence improving the funder’s position in Lebanese politics.  
With the outbreak of revolutions in the Arab countries, haraki Salafis regained 
power from the purist IHE’s network. This was not a unique event in Lebanon; it was 
consistent with many other countries. The uprisings resulted in the expansion of haraki 
Salafism and at the same time moving away from purists. This is mainly explained by the 
continuous support that purist leaders gave to the autocratic Arab regimes, issuing fatwas 
to try and save the losing leaders. In early 2011, “an anti-Shia group gained domination 
of the SRIH, and it did not tolerate al-Zaabi’s close contacts with the Shia party.”105  
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SRIH fired Al-Zaabi in view of his attempt to bring Salafis and the Shia Hezbollah into a 
mutual understanding and in view of his ties to Syrian leaders.106 
As can be deduced, the IHE mirrored the views of its funder, SRIH. Kuwait was 
the most charitable country in the Gulf before 2011, making it ideal for private charities 
because of the relaxed financial laws and lenient political oversight.107 When the IHE 
offered financial support to Salafis in the North, they had to abide by the red lines that the 
mother organization drew. Any deviation from that would threaten to block the flow of 
money. When the management of SRIH grew more aggressive against Hezbollah because 
of its intervention in Syria, they removed the founder of IHE from office.  
D. CONCLUSION 
States sponsored Lebanese Islamist organizations to gain a foothold in Lebanese 
politics, hence strengthening their position in Middle East geopolitics. This chapter 
considered al-Ahbash sponsored by Syria, the GCS sponsored by Saudi Arabia, and the 
IHE sponsored by Kuwait, looking into their decision-making processes compared to 
their funders’ vision. Al-Ahbash survived because of the political gain that the Syrian 
regime got from splitting the Lebanese Sunnis. The privileges that its members had and 
the compelling recruitment banner of seeking peace attracted many new members. The 
leaders of al-Ahbash were most probably interested in potential financial gain while 
prospering under the protection and blessing of the Syrian regime. Although GCS leaders 
denied being funded by states, evidence showed that the Gulf States were interested in 
strengthening the position of Salafis in Lebanon. Since 1990, Saudi Arabia had helped 
GCS through Gulf charities, and in return, GCS mirrored the funders and advocated for 
loyalty to the leaders. At the same time, they backed up the Saudi-sponsored sectarian 
Hariri family while clashing with the JI whose ideology was connected to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. IHE was a mirror of the Kuwaiti purist organization SRIH; this was evident 
with the change in IHE’s stance as more anti-Hezbollah as the leadership of SRIH 
became more anti-Hezbollah. The generous funding that Kuwait offered to IHE and other 
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Salafi organizations was accompanied by a condition that members of those 
organizations not criticize their leaders. All three studied organizations showed a 
tendency to vary their beliefs when that suited their funders. 
Iran, Qatar, Turkey, and other countries were also involved in the Lebanese 
Islamist world. Iran sought to legitimize its Islamic banner by supporting the PLO and 
other minor organizations in Lebanon. Yet, the Palestinian leadership refused to place 
itself under Iranian guardianship. This defection led some leaders, including Defense 
Minister Mustafa Shamran, to argue that the new Islamic Republic should choose a 
Lebanese constituency deprived of true leadership, such as the Shi’ites, rather than trying 
to help the unpredictable Palestinians.108 With the Iraq-Iran war, it was evident to Iran’s 
leadership that it was harder to sell its cause to a Sunni organization; with no Shi’ite 
organization that suited their agenda, Iran’s leaders managed to help create and fund 
Hezbollah. At the same time, Iran supported minor Sunni organizations and individual 
Sunni clerics in Lebanon to keep a presence in the Sunni world. One of the most 
controversial figures accused of being partially funded by Qatar was the hardline Salafi 
cleric Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir. According to Hazem El-Amin, an al-Hayat journalist, no 
one has a clear answer to who was arming al-Assir, but definitely, the weapons that he 
had suggest that money came from an external funding organization or state.109 In 
addition, Turkey has been working slowly and assiduously, via non-governmental 
organizations and government relief organizations such as the Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, to establish its foothold in Lebanon.110 This proves that the 
Lebanese stage is not closed to certain countries and any country can try to gain a 
foothold if that benefits its agenda. Built-in organizations are ready to shift their claims to 
mirror their funders. Several Salafi organizations, as shown in this chapter, have 
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alternated their role in internal politics depending on the money they received and the 
policy they carried. 
The next chapter examines organizations funded by non-state actors or by 
individuals who find the argument of those organizations compelling. States are not the 
sole funders of Salafism in Lebanon; other interested groups invest in Islamist 
organizations for their own reasons. JI, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, 
has had to interact with various Lebanese components in order to survive. The Islamic 
Unification Movement in Tripoli went through various stages throughout the 1980s, and 
it was highly affected by the Syrian influence in Lebanon during that era. In addition, al-
Qaeda inspired groups had some say in Lebanese politics. They recruited fresh volunteers 
based on hardline ideology; yet, did they act upon that ideology or for the political gains 
their funders might realize? The next chapter looks into those political components to see 
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IV. DECISION-MAKING IN LEBANESE ISLAMIST GROUPS 
WITH NON-STATE SPONSORS 
This chapter studies several movements that are not directly tied to state funders. 
Specifically, it examines the JI, the Islamic Unification Movement, Usbat al-Ansar, and 
Fateh al-Islam; and it looks at the relationships between them and their funders to see 
whether decision makers of such organizations take the benefits of the funding 
organization into consideration when working their own policies. Since JI was 
ideologically tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi-UAE-Egypt Axis hindered its 
development in many countries, including Lebanon. In order for them to survive, JI 
leaders had to work hand in hand with non-Muslim leaders and vote for them in the 
elections. The goal was to insure their political survival. The Islamic Unification 
Movement took over Tripoli and tried to apply Islamic Law. After gaining control over 
the area, they were soon crushed by the Syrian regime and its allies; consequently, the 
movement’s leadership switched to a more lenient approach and got funds from 
interested groups that saw in them potential for legitimacy in future Sunni-Sunni 
conflicts. Finally, al-Qaeda inspired ideology was a great device for Usbat al-Ansar and 
Fateh al-Islam to recruit and legitimize their presence in the Lebanese Sunni world. They 
received money accordingly and worked their best to continue to get funding even if in 
doing so they harmed their own image in the eyes of the public.  
A. AL JAMA’A AL-ISLAMIYYA 
Fathi Yakan (1933–2009), the founder of the JI, expressed his Islamic activism 
and orientation based on the vision of Hassan al-Bannah and Sayyid Qutb, forming the 
basis of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.111 To him, Islam had been fighting a hard 
battle; and only through actively fighting back could Muslims preserve their existence. In 
particular, he saw in Qutb’s militant ideology a successful strategy to prevail in such a 
fateful battle.112 Created in 1964, the JI became present in all of Lebanon’s cities and 
 
111 Robert Rabil, Religion, National Identity, and Confessional Politics in Lebanon: The Challenge of 
Islamism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 31. 
112 Rabil, Religion, National Identity, and Confessional Politics in Lebanon, 32. 
40 
villages.113 Across the country, the group has since established a network of schools and 
medical facilities that strengthen its influence. Moreover, the group has a strong presence 
in the religious sector that makes JI a very powerful Sunni Islamist actor with influence 
in various mosques and institutions. At the same time, JI competes with al-Ahbash and 
IUM, in addition to “the traditional Sunni religious establishment as represented by the 
Juridical Office (Dar al-Ifta’) and traditional leaders (the Karamis of Tripoli, the Salams 
of Beirut, and the Hariris of Saida), whom it regards as the instruments of foreign 
interests.”114 
The JI’s political survival has been highly affected by its leadership’s take on the 
war in Syria and the intervention of Hezbollah. On one hand, JI might remain on the 
fringes of Lebanese politics for its opposition to the Syrian regime, and the competition 
with the main Sunni rival, i.e., the Future Movement. On the other, JI might benefit from 
criticizing the Syrian regime and its local proxies since it resonates with many Lebanese 
Sunnis.115 Saad al-Hariri, leader of the Future Movement, was seen as moving closer to 
the axis led by Damascus and Hezbollah. He embraced an Assad loyalist, Sleiman 
Frangieh, as his candidate for the Lebanese presidency, and he quickly accepted the 
special tribunal for Lebanon’s verdict that favored Hezbollah; hence, his popularity 
among Sunnis weakened. In contrast, the leaders of JI switched from the older vision, 
which was closer to the Syrian regime, to a more hardline approach with “younger, more 
principled figures such as the secretary general Azzam Ayyoubi, Mohammed Sheikh 
Ammar (the new head of the Majlis al-Shura) and cleric Ahmad al-Omari.”116 They are 
lately winning the hearts and minds on the Sunnis with their objection to the role 
Hezbollah is playing in the region and opposing the Syrian regime. 
The relationship between JI and Hezbollah keeps has continued to evolve over 
time. At the start of Hezbollah in 1982, the two Islamist groups found in Israel a common 
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enemy and a reason to collaborate. JI’s military wing, Quwwat al-Fajr, and Hezbollah 
coordinated more than one operation against Israel.117 Yakan formed a political front of 
his own, in an alliance with Hezbollah, after the assassination of Hariri in 2005.118 
Although the relationship started deteriorating after the 2000s, real problems came after 
Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian war. The political differences have not yet led to 
military confrontations between members, but they both have strong support bases in 
various places in Lebanon that might lead to clashes in the future. So far, perhaps 
knowing that JI will lose any confrontation against Hezbollah, Ayyoubi has so far 
persistently advised JI members to refrain from any sectarian conflict with the Shi’ites.119 
The group’s leadership tries to appeal to Sunnis by politically attacking Hezbollah and 
the Syrian regime while at the same time trying to keep the internal stage conflict-free.120 
To insure a place in the Lebanese politics, JI has collaborated with parties that 
were traditionally on the opposite side. In as yet unsuccessful effort to attract new 
recruits, JI offers less sophisticated social welfare services than the ones that Hezbollah 
provides; the results at the ballot show that it won “three seats in the 1992 parliamentary 
elections but just one seat in 1996.”121 The axis made up of Saudi Arabia, the United 
Emirates, and Egypt has led to the abandonment of Jama’a by the Future Movement in 
the elections. In a completely non-ideological act for political reasons (survival), it had to 
align with the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) in the 2016 elections.122 This decision was 
not beneficial for Jama’a as they lost in the elections and lost some credibility in the 
Sunni population. 
To sum up the JI’s position, this study deduces that Jama’a is a relatively minor 
player in the Lebanese Sunni politics because of the inconsistency between its ideology 
and its political decisions. Jama’a follows the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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States do not seem to fund the Jama’a; rather, the group attracts individual funds from 
believers in the ideology. Jama’a leaders insist that it is a self-funded organization 
although they admit that some funds “do come from charitable organizations and 
sympathizers in the Gulf region.”123 JI diverged from its core ideology occurred during 
the elections and in its relationship with Hezbollah, primarily for survival and pursuit of a 
larger role in domestic politics. Hence, its main ideological enemy is al-Ahbash whereas 
its main political competitor is the Future Movement.  
B. ISLAMIC UNIFICATION MOVEMENT (IUM) 
The militant Sunni group IUM was founded by Sheikh Sa’id Sha’ban’s (who died 
in 1998), splitting from the JI in 1982.124 It gradually took control over Tripoli by 
militarily defeating several rivals up until its peak of power in 1984 when Khalil ‘Akkawi 
and Kan’an Naji, two important leaders of the IUM, organized their own associations.125 
The IUM imposed Islamic laws in Tripoli, and violently struck the opposition in order to 
consolidate an Islamic state. They openly killed a number of communists who dared 
question their rulings. The Sha’ban’s IUM had to collaborate with Hezbollah and the 
PLO to ensure a place in the Lebanese politics. Thus, Sha’ban’s frequently went to Iran 
and grew close ties to Hezbollah; moreover, the PLO trained his fighters. They got their 
weapons from captured Lebanese Army forces and Internal Security forces barracks 
during the civil war. As stated in Chapter II, the Syrian Army crushed the IUM in 1985, 
but the group was allowed to remain unarmed to serve Syrian agendas. In addition, this 
might have occurred because of Sha’ban’s links to Iran.126 In 1988, IUM forces directed 
their militant power to fight Israeli forces and its puppets side by side with the Islamic 
Resistance. This major shift was a direct consequence of the Syrian intervention.  
The organization changed fronts to ensure its political survival. Sa’id Sha’ban’s 
favored a uniting Islamic rule that forms an umbrella for other religions separate from 
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sectarianism, nationalism, and democratic pluralism.127 He considered the Syrians as 
rescuers of the Lebanese Maronites through the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976. 
On the other hand, in the post-war years, aside from a very few moments in which he 
criticized the Syrian regime, he was careful not to disturb its authorities. In fact, he 
supported the Syrian military presence in Lebanon considering it the mother organization 
that had the potential to lead an armed action against Israel.128 This was a lesson learned 
from 1985 to ensure the survival of the organization.  
The IUM most probably received money from Iran, the PLO, and individual 
supporters. The organization does not openly reveal its source of funding; hence, the 
tracking of its finances is difficult. When the IUM was formed, it was widely believed 
that Iran had financed it.129 Yet, Sha’ban’s alliance with the PLO in 1983 provided him 
with yet another source of money and arms.130 An article by Tony Badran, posted by 
Washington’s “Foundation for Defense of Democracies,” considers the organization as 
an Iranian asset backed by the PLO.131 On the other hand, in an interview, Bilal Sha’aban, 
the head of IUM since the 2000s, states that the funding was only local. He declares that 
donations come from advertisements on the radio, revenues from medical clinics, Zakat, 
membership fees, and donations from friends and supporters overseas.132 Before the 
crackdown on the organization in 1986, it served as a spearhead for anti-Syrian 
organizations. Its control over Tripoli was of great advantage to Iran in its competition 
with Syria for control in Lebanon. At the same time, it helped Yasser Arafat, the head of 
the PLO, to legitimize his fight against Syria. After the civil war, the organization 
avoided clashes with the Syrian forces to insure its survival. In recent times, the IUM has 
continued to side with Hezbollah due to the financial support from Iran.  
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C. AL-QAEDA-INSPIRED SALAFIS 
Groups affected by al-Qaeda ideology will continue to exist on the Lebanese soil 
for a while but with varying degrees of influence on Lebanese politics. For at least the 
past 14 years, small groups have acted independently without a shared Islamic 
framework. They are “independent of al-Qaeda in terms of logistics and finances, but are 
inspired by its ideology.”133 They get support from individual sympathizers who find the 
grievances that those groups share appealing. Some groups have clashed with the security 
forces and this led to their demise (the Diniyeh group in 2000 and Fateh al-Islam in 
2007), whereas others had a few skirmishes but continue to exist today (Usbat al-Ansar 
and Jund al-Sham). Recently, in September 2020, the armed forces clashed with a new 
group in Wadi Khaled in the north, killing 13 of its members and capturing 15. The next 
day, a suicide bomber tried to sneak into an army base but was shot before he got to his 
target. This illustrates how the al-Qaeda threat is still alive to this day. 
These groups have shared characteristics that identify them. First, they do not 
participate in elections and have a distrust of the political process. Second, they see 
themselves are protectors of true Muslims and try to implement what they see as the “rule 
of God.” In order to accomplish that, some have fought against the Americans in Iraq 
whereas others have conducted attacks against the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon in southern Lebanon.134 Third, unlike other Salafis, al-Qaeda inspired 
organizations keep their activities private.135 They rarely disclose their operations, 
seldom claim responsibility for bombings or military actions, and work in secrecy. This 
chapter looks into Usbat al-Ansar and Fateh al-Islam to see what influence money had on 
their decisions.  
1. Usbat al-Ansar 
Usbat al-Ansar is a Sunni extremist group that works on Lebanese soil; it is 
affiliated with al-Qaeda and follows the same fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. It 
 




first emerged in the Ain al-Helwi Palestinian refugee camp near Saida in the early 1990s. 
The group aims to establish a radical Sunni Islamic state in Lebanon and to prevent “what 
they perceive as anti-Sunni Islamic influences in Lebanon.”136 Later on, the group 
conducted several operations against nightclubs and liquor stores; they also assassinated 
Lebanese religious leaders.137 Moreover, its members fought against the Coalition Forces 
in Iraq in the mid-2000s. Nonetheless, Usbat al-Ansar has been careful not to be linked to 
such actions in fear of losing internal support from Lebanese Sunnis; hence, it rarely 
claims any attacks that its members conduct inside Lebanese territory.  
The actions conducted by Usbat al-Ansar strongly reflect its funders’ plans and 
visions. It is likely that international Sunni extremist networks support the group.138 The 
group has reportedly received money from both the al-Qaeda network and the Abu 
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi network; it also has links to “al-Diniyeh group, Takfir wal Hijra, 
Asbat al-Nur, and Jund al-Sham, which in turn have links to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi 
network.”139 Although they do not always claim responsibility for their operations, 
several attacks on courts, Lebanese Army posts in Saida, and other governmental 
buildings were reliably attributed to Usbat al-Ansar. After 9/11, the group was part of the 
global network that followed the al-Qaeda agenda. Usbat al-Ansar was responsible for 
killing a U.S. missionary in Saida in 2002, and for attacking Western fast-food 
restaurants all over Lebanon around the same time.140 The timings of such operations 
suggest that the group serves as loyalists to the networks that fund them. 
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2. Fateh al-Islam 
Fateh al-Islam (FAI) was established November 26, 2006, when its founder, 
Shakir al-Absi, took over bases in Nahr al-Barid camp in North Lebanon that belonged to 
Fatah al-Intifada, raising black banners with the inscription tawhid over the camp, and 
distributing papers that included his plan to bring “religion to the Palestinian cause.”141 
There are indications, however, that a long time before the official move, the group had 
gathered and solidified its grip inside the camp. Al-Absi was imprisoned for three years 
in Syria for arms dealing, for example, and then he mysteriously appeared in Nahr al-
Barid upon his release. Members of FAI had some friction with Lebanese Army soldiers 
at the entrance of the camp, yet little could be done since according to the 1969 Cairo 
Agreement, Lebanese security forces cannot enter the refugee camps. Still, international 
networks of the Salafi militants in the Palestinian camps suffered some losses of 
materials and personnel with raids by the Lebanese security forces outside the camps. 
Most probably, the Palestinian camps in Lebanon have become “more global in their 
nature and identity” because of the international training and financing networks.142 
FAI has had ties to more than one external actor but it was mainly linked to the al-
Qaeda network and Syrian intelligence. When the group’s plans failed and the Lebanese 
Army was taking over, Shahin Shahin, a Palestinian from Nablus whose real name was 
Azzam Nahar, took over the group.143 The Congregation of Palestinian ‘Ulama met with 
the FAI leadership several times, and one representative of the Congregation reported 
that Shahin Shahin was among the elements linking FAI to al-Qaeda.144 Al-Qaeda 
ideology was beneficial to give the group legitimacy in its fight against the Lebanese 
Army. At the same time, Ahmed Mar’i, an FAI detainee, confessed to the Lebanese 
police that the Syrian intelligence services were on good terms with the movement. Those 
who believe that FAI was a tool of the Syrian regime consider that the change in the 
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leadership was a show to erase the Syrian ties. The disappearance of Absi, though, raises 
many questions as to how he was able to leave the surrounded camp and why he has not 
showed up somewhere else. Nevertheless, FAI is a fragmented group in which global 
jihadis and local Salafis have fought in the same front with former Fatah al-Intifada 
members and criminals who were recruited in Lebanese prisons. This negates the idea of 
a united group fully running for a unified ideological or political goal. 
Money was the main motivator for most members of the FAI, whereas the group 
was allowed to exist for political gain by the Syrian regime. Palestinian militias opposing 
the Oslo Accords and regional groups that sought to restore Syrian hegemony in 
Lebanese affairs most probably supported FAI.145 In addition, links with al-Qaeda groups 
provided the FAI with access to many foreign fighters who joined the group for financial 
gain. In fact, a majority of the recruits included those who sought to gain income.146 
Those were mostly foreign fighters who spilled over from Iraq and other places. Different 
supporters and sponsors seem to have aided the FAI: Ahmed Jibril’s Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) and Abu Musa’s Fatah al-
Intifada provided at least logistic help.147 Moreover, local cells provided training on 
explosives and managed the recruitment inside Lebanon whereas global jihadis assisted 
in “financing, recruitment, and propaganda.”148 Both the leader of the group and its 
second in command (Abu Horeira) were imprisoned in Syrian jails for a while before 
being released. This might mean that they were recruited there and only allowed to be set 
free on the condition that they were to serve the Syrian regime’s interests. Their 
motivation hence was survival and financial gain. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The use of violence in the Lebanese Sunni world started as a socio-revolutionary 
movement then changed to a pan-Islamist one, and at a later stage, to a sectarian 
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movement.149 The IUM was the first socio-revolutionary movement that existed during 
the civil war. Later, Usbat al-Ansar continued with the bombing of places serving alcohol 
with a moral justification for the casualties without adopting a jihadi strategy. A new 
stage was developed in the 2000s with the attacks on American fast-food chains in 
Lebanon, and the failed attempt to assassinate the American ambassador. Between 2005 
and 2011, Islamists shared a pan-Islamist ideology and an anti-Shia (sectarian) one. It 
was only after the Arab Spring that hatred of the Shia justified the cause in light of 
Hezbollah’s participation in the war in Syria. For the JI, the political struggle for survival 
resonated more than the principles and ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Their decision-
making process was concerned more with maintaining a presence in the political sphere, 
allowing them to violate the Islamic principles that they claim to adhere to. In the ballot, 
they coordinated and ordered their adhering supporters to vote for the hardline Christian 
party FPM. Contrary to their calculations, and although their supporters blindly followed 
the orders, supporters of the FPM did not vote for their candidates. This was a significant 
embarrassment for the JI leadership and questioned the correctness of their choice.  
The IUM and al-Qaeda-inspired movements in Lebanon both sought financial 
gains more than political survival. IUM leaders opposed Syrian authority in North 
Lebanon for the convenience of their funders, Iran and the PLO. Even after the 
crackdown on the organization by supporters of the Syrian regime, the IUM continued to 
receive funds from pro-Iran organizations such as Hezbollah, and hence, the IUM 
continued to adhere to Iran’s policies in the area. Even with the growing hatred toward 
Shia organizations, the IUM has continued to support and coordinate with Hezbollah 
while still receiving money from Iran. Al-Qaeda inspired organizations have used the 
ideology to legitimize their own existence and receive support from believers while at the 
same time aiming for personal gains in fragmented groups. Decision makers of those 
groups have not able to unify the opposing agendas under one banner, which has led to 
the weakening of and crackdown on those affiliations.  
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This chapter looked at JI, IUM, Usbat al-Ansar, and FAI; it deduced that while 
the JI leaders took decisions based on the group’s political survival, the remaining 
observed organizations aimed for financial gains. This continues the findings of Chapter 
III about the state-funded organizations. It seems that the Lebanese Islamists in general, 
and the Salafis in particular, care more about the continuous flow of resources than they 
do about selling the ideological banners that they raise. The next chapter presents the 
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Outside interest was the main catalyst for Islamists to thrive in Lebanon. If one 
had taken a survey of the major political parties and organizations in Lebanon in 1980, he 
would hardly have found any Islamic movements of political significance.150 With the 
flow of money from interested states and organizations, the Lebanese Sunni sphere 
witnessed the emergence of new groupings in different niches. Some of these groups 
were interrelated and members switched from one group to the other, whereas others 
were rivals. Groups that proved themselves worthy of funding received substantial money 
and were encouraged to spread their influence to improve their funders’ power in the 
geopolitical sphere. 
A. SUMMARY OF POLITICAL SURVEY 
In general, the Lebanese Islamist groups, including Salafi organizations, showed a 
willingness at the leadership level to depart from their ideology for the sake of satisfying 
their bankrollers. Table 1 summarizes the findings of this research. Although it does not 
show all the findings, this table displays the groups that were looked at in the research to 
reach a conclusion as to what mainly drives their decisions. Al-Ahbash was mainly 
sponsored by Syria, adopted the Sufi ideology, and aligned itself with the Syrian regime. 
The group competed with Salafis and the JI in winning the hearts and minds of Sunnis. 
Although political survival was important to al-Abash and some members adopted the 
ideology in total belief, their main motivator was found to be financial. Meanwhile, the 
GCS was sponsored by Saudi Sarabia, adopted the activist Salafi ideology, and 
positioned itself against the rulers and against the Shia. The GCS competed with al-
Ahbash and the JI to spread its influence mainly in North Lebanon. The group kept its 
activist ideology mainly since it attracted a good income from Gulf States and state-
related organizations. On the other hand, the IHE was a Kuwaiti sponsored, purist Salafi 
organization. The organization aligned itself with the ruler, facing activist Salafis in the 
Sunni sphere. Although political events pushed for an activist agenda, the IHE remained 
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within its funders’ agenda and kept advocating for loyalty to the rulers in order to secure 
the flow of money. 
Table 1. Summary of the Groups 
 
The JI was the only group that deviated from the overall trend of following the 
money. Loyalists to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology sponsored the JI, which advocated 
overturning the current political system. Perhaps the political struggle with the Saudi-
Egypt-UAE axis was so high that JI leaders found it hard to stay in the game. They 
competed with the Salafis and al-Ahbash on an ideological basis, but sought survival 
Group Sponsor Ideology Political Alignment Main Adversary 
Main 
Driver 
Al-Ahbash Syria Sufism Pro-Syria Salafis, JI Financial 
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Salafism 
Anti-Syria JI, Syrian Loyalists Financial 
IUM 1988–Present Iran 
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Salafism 
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Fateh Al-Islam Al-Qaeda 
Jihadi 
Salafism 
Militant Islam Lebanese Authority Financial 
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through political agreements that opposed their ideology. To ensure that they remained a 
party in the Lebanese political system, they aligned themselves with hardline Christians. 
Today, although being the second leading political power after the Future Movement in 
the Lebanese Sunni sphere, they have no representative on the national level. This might 
explain why they are not currently driven by the influence of money; rather, they are 
aiming for political survival. 
Although the IUM had a hardline ideology upon its formation, the group 
developed an interest in Iran’s money that tune-fined its decisions. Before the crackdown 
by the Syrian Army and its local proxies and allies, the IUM adopted an activist Salafi 
ideology, and got funding from Iran and the PLO to develop an anti-Syrian stand. It 
controlled Tripoli for a while and developed an Islamic State that lasted a couple of years. 
During this period, IUM members killed a few opposing voices, and maintained its rule 
over its independent territory. Ideology was a driving factor for the IUM’s actions, but its 
main motive was to keep the flow of money coming from Iran and the flow of weapons 
and equipment from the PLO. After being smashed by the Syrian axis, the IUM was 
allowed to survive to keep the Sunnis fragmented. The IUM also kept receiving funds 
from Iran, but switched to a purist Salafi ideology that advocated for being loyal to the 
rulers. The group switched its voice to the broader, more compelling argument of 
advocating against Israel. That way, the IUM maintained the flow of money from Iran 
while at the same time avoided harming the Syrian regime. 
Finally, al-Qaeda-inspired groups recruited jobless and convicted criminals for the 
sake of financial gains. They adopted Jihadi Salafism and aligned themselves with the 
dream of an Islamic Umma. In reality, those groups were fragmented and they members 
were largely interested in financial gains. This research looked into Usbat Al-Ansar and 
Fateh Al-Islam, two groups that are openly pro- al-Qaeda’s. Usbat Al-Ansar openly 
opposed the PLO while covertly defying the authority of the Lebanese government; yet, 
in reality, they maintained the flow of money from al-Qaeda supporters in the world by 
selling the ideology of sacrificing themselves for the Umma. At the same time, Fateh al-
Islam gathered different members who each had their own agenda. Mostly, its members 
were driven by financial gain and they openly opposed the Lebanese authority. Their 
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failure to mobilize the Sunni population was mainly because of their terroristic approach 
by which they conducted various operations that involved civilian casualties. This 
maintained the flow of money from individuals who supported their cause, and allowed 
the groups to get financial gains. 
In conclusion, funded by various states and state-like organizations that grew 
interested in Lebanese politics, Islamist groups expanded their power in Lebanon. With 
their competing agendas, leaders of those groups got financial support from external 
groups in return for advocating the bankrollers’ agendas. For the most part, leaders of the 
groups sought financial gains, and allowed for deviations from the proclaimed ideologies 
of their groups. As long as these groups remained a player in the Lebanese politics and 
got the green bills, they have been willing to sacrifice part of their ideology.  
B. MAIN FINDINGS 
This research considered three hypotheses in an attempt to explain the main 
influencer in Lebanese Islamist’s decisions.  
1. First Hypothesis Finding: Ideological Considerations 
The first hypothesis expected that ideological divides motivate the decisions taken 
by the Lebanese Salafi groups. Throughout the observed groups, ideology seems to be an 
excuse to recruit and control; yet, it does not seem to be an “all in” approach. Rather, 
leaders who do not show leniency in adapting their ideology to new circumstances seem 
to depart from their organizations. The IUM switched from being an activist Salafi group 
to a purist one after its military defeat; in turn, its members no longer viewed the Syrian 
regime as the enemy, but instead saw it as Israel. Founders of organizations, on the other 
hand, left their groups after disagreements with the groups’ funders. The IHE founder, the 
young Sheikh Safwan al-Zaabi, was removed from office by the Kuwaiti SRIH 
leadership. The JI founder Fathi Yakan departed from the group to form his own 
organization after disagreements with other leaders. 
Although ideology was the face of some struggles, it looks like leaders of those 
groups used this debate to favor their political standing. Al-Ahbash adapted its ideology 
in time to compete against the JI and Salafis. Al-Qaeda-inspired groups also used their 
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ideology to advocate for fund-raising events. From the findings, it seems that ideology is 
not the main motivator of Lebanese Salafi groups. Rather, ideology is used as a cover to 
recruit and attract funders. 
2. Second Hypothesis Finding: Political Considerations 
The second hypothesis suggested that political considerations are the main 
motivations that drive decision-making among the leaders of Lebanese Salafi groups; 
they revise their ideologies continuously to achieve specific political objectives. After 
studying the groups presented in this research, it seems that the JI was the only group that 
applied such a policy. With competition from the Saudi-Egypt-UAE axis, the JI aligned 
itself with the FPM, a hardline Maronite Christian party. This agreement was not to its 
benefit at the ballot box as the members of the FPM did not elect the JI representatives, 
and the JI ended up with no official representation. 
Other groups also sought political survival, but were more driven by the money 
flow. Al-Ahbash, for example, was concerned about remaining a player in Lebanese 
politics, but receiving financial aid was of bigger importance. Meanwhile, the GCS and 
IHE competed for political control over Tripoli and the North but only to ensure 
financing from the Gulf charities. Thus, this hypothesis seems not to work for the 
Lebanese Islamist groups.  
3. Third Hypothesis Finding: Financial Considerations 
The third hypothesis proposed that the role of state and non-state sponsors is more 
influential to the Lebanese Salafi decision makers than the ideological claims which they 
profess. This hypothesis seems to be the most compelling as all but one of the studied 
groups seem to follow such reasoning. The GCS mirrored the Saudi wishes in controlling 
the Lebanese Sunnis; they activated the public and adapted their ideology to suit the 
mother funder. When being anti-Shia secured better external financing, the IHE and al-
Qaeda-inspired organizations became more hardline. The split among Gulf Salafis 
resulted in a split among Lebanese Salafis, which suggests that the funders conveyed 
their vision to their funded proxies. 
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Events show that Lebanese Islamist groups are ready to deviate from their 
ideologies to mirror the views of their external state and non-state sponsors. When al-
Qaeda leaders asked all true followers to conduct operations against U.S. interests, their 
Lebanese sympathizers followed the request and conducted several operations. Instead of 
fighting disbelievers and aligning with people of faith, al-Ahbash worked for the Syrian 
regime’s agenda. It saw in the Salafis and the JI enemies of the faith, and adopted an 
ideology that recognized this belief instead of befriending them and taking Christians as 
enemies, for example. This indicates that the funders played a significant role in adjusting 
their recipients’ ideology in the way that best serves the funders’ interests. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Lebanese Islamist groups are constantly competing for power in the Lebanese 
Sunni sphere. Lebanon is a sovereign country and regional states should not meddle in its 
internal affairs by promoting dangerous actors that undermine its stability and the 
stability of the region as well as the international community. Several times, the position 
taken by one or more of these groups has affected Western interests in the region. In an 
attempt to push those groups into changing their point of view, U.S. Middle East 
strategists might have mistakenly sought to pressure those groups into changing their 
stand. This study suggests that Islamist groups in Lebanon only have a range in which 
they are allowed to decide. Apart from that, their decision-making process passes through 
a “bankroller interest” filter. If those actions are seen to harm the funders, the group 
leaders find a way to go around them, and include their actions in a seemingly well-
designed ideological strategy. 
This suggests that the key to make those organizations change their stand is 
through their funders. Pressure should be directed towards the funders rather than the 
organizations for an efficient use of resources. For example, if one Salafi group conducts 
an operation and takes American hostages to serve a certain political objective, 
conducting negotiations with them is a waste of time and resources. This research 
suggests that pressure should be exerted on their funders; only with sincere requests from 
their funders, will Lebanese Islamist groups accept to resolve the issue. U.S. Middle East 
foreign area officers should keep in mind an up-to-date funder-organization relationship 
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study, and make good use of it in situations that require a Lebanese group to deviate from 
its core ideological stand. Only with the help of the funder can issues be resolved 
smoothly.  
At the same time, given how flexible Salafis are with their ideology, the Lebanese 
government or its Western allies may be able to buy the Salafis off. Salafis may be an 
efficient proxy tool to balance against another proxy actor in Lebanon, i.e., Hezbollah. 
Hence, any weakening of the Salafis would lead to strengthening Iran’s proxy in 
Lebanon. This case illustrates that threats inside Lebanon can metastasize into regional 
and global threats, and therefore the international community should support efforts to 
halt external interference in Lebanon through the material support for religious 
fundamentalists. It might be hard to stop foreign states from interfering in Lebanese 
Islamist groups because of the return value that those actors gain from their geopolitical 
game. Yet, if the United States exerted enough pressure on interested outsiders, they 
might refrain from intervening in Lebanon’s internal affairs when they consider that their 
losses outweigh their gains. 
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